Lord Neuberger, President of the UK Supreme Court, has issued one of his presidential proclamations – which is what he does when he wishes to change the law from his lofty but unaccountable position. Nominally the case he was considering, Arnold v Britton & Others, was a simple enough matter regarding service charges for a set of chalets on the Gower peninsula: clause 3(2) of the lease said the price for work such as mowing grass, maintaining roads through the site and sewers &c was to be £90 in 1974 rising by 10% a year; how should this be interpreted nearly 40 years on when the annual figure was more than £3,000 per chalet and rising? (Inflation would produced a figure of less than £800 by 2012.)
If the charge were truly to rise by 10% a year the lessor would be making a very substantial surplus over the term of the lease thanks to compounding (Year 2: £90 + £9 = £99; year 3: £99 + £9.90 = £108.90 and so on annually.) As Davis LJ in the Court of Appeal noted:
“The figures before us are illustrative of the consequences. For a lease on a one year compounded uplift, the annual service charge payable was, for the year end 2012, some £3,060. At the same compounded annual rate of increase, the projected annual sum payable for service charges in the last year of the term stands to be some £1,025,004: this for modest holiday chalets, the use of which is restricted to half of each year.”
That’s a million pounds per chalet. There were 25 involved in the litigation but 91 in total, some with a less onerous system of payment for services. The outcomes would vary depending on when the leases were issued. Nevertheless, if the clause in the lease were allowed to stand, the lessors would have pulled in hundreds of millions in pure profit over the 99 years of the lease. This on a term of the lease which, it is axiomatic, should not be profit-making since it is merely for the lessor to recover expenditure on ongoing maintenance of the common facilities (see Lease – though holiday chalet leases aren’t covered by legislation for homes). Continue reading
The Brexit court case (Miller/Santos): Day one digested
Here are some of what seem to this writer crucial exchanges during the Brexit High Court case R (Miller and Santos) v Secretary of State. mainly to do with Lord Pannick’s first day arguments for the claimants. The links to the transcripts appear at the bottom along with quoted cases and comment. A report/analysis of the Supreme Court case is here: What if Eadie was right?
Firstly, two extracts from the first day of this case (Oct 13)
Exchange between Lord Justice Sales and Lord Pannick QC (for Miller) at page 54/55 of the draft transcript:
SALES LJ: Am I right in thinking that you say that the effect of the argument for the government would be that there wouldn’t need to be a repeal of the 1972 Act or section 2 of it, it is just that the content of the obligation in section 2, EU rights, would fall away, because they would cease to be EU rights?
16 LORD PANNICK: Precisely. Your Lordship is very aware and I am not going to enter into any political debate, but your Lordship knows that the government have announced that there is going to be a great repeal bill which is to be produced some time in the next session. I say that the consequence of the defendant giving notification will be that at a point in the future, it is inevitably the case that the United Kingdom leaves the EU and the consequence of that, as a matter of law, is that all of the rights enjoyed under section 2(1) and
page 55
section 3(1), which is the process rights relating to the Court of Justice, fall away. There is simply nothing left. And therefore a great repeal bill, politically or otherwise, may be desirable. I say nothing about that. It will not affect those questions. Those rights will fall away as a consequence of the United Kingdom leaving the EU. Because when we leave, there are no treaty obligations. That is the whole point of leaving. And indeed that is the government’s intention. This is not a happenstance, this is the whole point of notification. Notification is intended to remove the current substance of section 2(1) and 3(1). Continue reading →
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Filed under Analysis, Business law, Comment, Constitution, EU law, Henry VIII powers, Human rights, Law, Legal, Politics, Public law, UK Constitution, UK Law, UK Politics
Tagged as Brexit, Brexit court case, European Union, In the Matter of JE and AO, R (Miller and Santos) v Secretary of State